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JURISDICTION
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a3(2)(j). This appeal was transferred to this Court by the Utah Supreme Court.
ISSUES PRESENTED
1.

Did the trial court correctly conclude that the plaintiffs damage claims were

derivative as a matter of law when the undisputed evidence established that the
plaintiff, as a limited partner, was attempting to directly recover fees that had been
paid by the limited partnership entity, and the plaintiff had not established any
individual injury separately suffered apartfromthe partnership itself?
2.

Did the trial court correctly conclude that the plaintiff failed to present

evidence in opposition to the defendants' summary judgment motion as required
by Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e)?
3.

Did the trial court correctly deny the plaintiffs motion for reconsideration of

the summary judgment order when no procedure authorizes a motion for
reconsideration, and the plaintiff failed to present any evidence justifying its effort
to directly pursue claims that are necessarily possessed by the limited partnership
entity?
4.

Did the trial court correctly determine that the plaintiffs motion to amend its

complaint was moot when the plaintiff failed to present any justification, either
legal, procedural, or evidentiary, excusing its failure to comply with applicable
1

statutory and procedural law regarding the proper assertion of derivative claims for
relief?
STANDARD OF REVIEW AND RECORD PRESERVATION
The trial court's judgment was the result of a summary judgment motion,
and thus this Court accords the trial court's legal conclusions no deference, and
reviews the same for correctness. Arnold Industries. Inc. v. Love. 63 P.3d 721,
725 (Utah 2002) ("We grant the trial court's legal conclusions no deference,
reviewing them for correctness.") (Citations omitted). The issues set forth above
were addressed by the trial court on summary judgment, and are thus preserved for
review. R. at 432-36, 575-82.
APPLICABLE STATUTES AND RULES
1.

Utah Code Ann. § 48-2a-1001:
A limited partner may bring an action in the right of a limited partnership to

recover a judgment in its favor if general partners with authority to do so have
refused to bring the action and the general partners' decision not to sue constitutes
an abuse of discretion or involves a conflict of interest that prevents an
unprejudiced exercise of judgment, or if an effort to cause those general partners to
bring the action is not likely to succeed.

2

2.

Utah Code Ann. § 48-2a-1003:
In a derivative action, the complaint shall set forth with particularity the

effort of the plaintiff to secure initiation of the action by a general partner or the
reasons for not making the effort.
3.

Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 23.1:
In a derivative action brought by one or more shareholders or members to

enforce a right of a corporation or of an unincorporated association, the corporation
or association having failed to enforce a right which may properly be asserted by it,
the complaint shall be verified and shall allege (1) that the plaintiff was a
shareholder or member at the time of the transaction of which he complains or that
his share or membership thereafter devolved on him by operation of law, and (2)
that the action is not a collusive one to confer jurisdiction on a court of the United
States which it would not otherwise have. The complaint shall also allege with
particularity the efforts, if any, made by the plaintiff to obtain the action he desires
from the directors or comparable authority and, if necessary, from the shareholders
or members, and the reasons for his failure to obtain the action or for not making
the effort. The derivative action may not be maintained if it appears that the
plaintiff does not fairly and adequately represent the interest of the shareholders or
members similarly situated in enforcing the right of the corporation or association.
The action shall not be dismissed or compromised without approval of the court,
3

and notice of the proposed dismissal or compromise shall be given to shareholders
or members in such manner as the court directs.
4.

Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c):
The [summary judgment] motion, memoranda and affidavits shall be in

accordance with Rule 7. The judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary
judgment, interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone
although there is a genuine issue as to the amount of damages.
5.

Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e):
Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge,

shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show
affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein.
Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit
shall be attached thereto and served therewith. The court may permit affidavits to
be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answer to interrogatories, or further
affidavits.

V/hen a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as

provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or
denials of the pleadings, but the response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in
4

this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.
Summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against a party failing to file
such a response.
6.

Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 7(c)(3)(A):
A memorandum supporting a motion for summary judgment shall contain a

statement of material facts as to which the moving party contends no genuine issue
exists. Each fact shall be separately stated and numbered and supported by citation
to relevant materials, such as affidavits or discovery materials. Each fact set forth
in the moving party's memorandum is deemed admitted for the purpose of
summary judgment unless controverted by the responding party.
7.

Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 7(c)(3)(B):
A memorandum opposing a motion for summary judgment shall contain a

verbatim restatement of each of the moving party's facts that is controverted, and
may contain a separate statement of additional facts in dispute. For each of the
moving party's facts that is controverted, the opposing party shall provide an
explanation of the grounds for any dispute, supported by citation to relevant
materials, such as affidavits or discovery materials. For any additional facts set
forth in the opposing memorandum, each fact shall be separately stated and
numbered and supported by citation to supporting materials, such as affidavits or
discovery materials.
5

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW
1.

Nature of the Case:
This case arises from the operation and management of Clark Leaming

Properties.

CL Management serves as general partner of Clark Leaming

Properties. See R. at 1-6. Clark Leaming Properties and CL Management are both
valid and existing Utah limited partnerships. R. at 207-8.
Clark Leaming Properties is a holding company for certain real property
investments, and CL Management as general partner manages those investments
for the benefit of Clark Leaming Properties. Id. In exchange for the various
management services provided by CL Management, Clark Leaming Properties
pays certain fees to CL Management for that work. Id. The payment of fees to CL
Management is authorized under the partnership agreement for Clark Leaming
Properties. R. at 209,386.
The plaintiff, GLFP, claims to be a limited partner of Clark Leaming
Properties.1 R. at 2. On February 8, 2005, GLFP filed this lawsuit alleging that
1

CL Management disputes that GLFP possesses standing to pursue this
litigation under Utah Code Ann. § 48-2a-1002 ("In a derivative action, the plaintiff
must be a partner at the time of bringing the action and . . . must have been a
partner at the time of the transaction of which he complains; . . .."). In 2002,
documents were signed that state GLFP assigned its limited partnership interests in
CL Management and Clark Leaming Properties to the separate entities of Ming,
Ltd and Sumerlea, Ltd. R. at 288-90, 302-305. These assignments have been
Cont'd.
6

CL Management had collected excessive fees from Clark Leaming Properties in
breach of its fiduciary duties, and that CL Management used the excessive fees to
support Clark-only businesses. R. at 1-6. GLFP, in addition, claimed that CL
Management mismanaged Clark Leaming Properties, and the property investments
held by Clark Leaming Properties. Id. The breach of fiduciary duty claim is the
lone damage claim set forth in GLFP's complaint. R. at 5-6. GLFP combined the
breach offiduciaryduty claim with claims for dissolution of CL Management and
Clark Leaming Properties, and an accounting. Id. The accounting claim is not
pled as a separate claim, but rather GLFP requested an accounting "as part of the
dissolution" claim. R. at 6.
2.

Course of Relevant Proceedings Below:
On July 20, 2005, CL Management filed a motion for summary judgment.

R. at 191-92. This motion sought an order holding that GLFP had illegally
asserted derivative claims for relief contrary to applicable statutory and procedural
law. Id. On August 15, 2005, CL Management filed an additional summary
judgment motion. R. at 279-80. This motion requested summary judgment on the
ground that GLFP had assigned its limited partnership interests in Clark Leaming
Properties and CL Management to the separate entities of Ming, Ltd and Sumerlea,
recognized and implemented by CL Management and Clark Leaming Properties.
R. at 367-68, 371-72. Ming, Ltd and Sumerlea Ltd are not parties to this litigation.
SeeR. atl.
7

Ltd in 2002, and therefore GLFP was divested of standing to pursue the litigation.

GLFP opposed the summary judgment motions.

With respect to the

derivative motion, GLFP argued that its complaint did not set forth derivative
theories of recovery, and even if it did, GLFP should be excused from complying
with otherwise applicable law and procedure. R. at 252-61. As for the motion
directed to the assignments, GLFP claimed that the assignments should not be
enforced because they had not been intentionally delivered, and the assignments
were unenforceable under certain equitable principles. R. at 311-21.
The trial court heard argument on October 31, 2005. R. at 421. On
November 7, 2005, the trial court issued a memorandum decision, wherein
summary judgment was granted in favor of CL Management. R. at 432-36. The
trial court found that GLFP had improperly brought a derivative-based complaint
in violation of Utah statutory law and procedure:
After, again, reviewing the record in this matter, the Court agrees that
GLFP is seeking to assert, directly, claims that are, as a matter of law,
derivative. Indeed, although GLFP may ultimately experience the
indirect effect of the alleged wrongdoing, the undisputed evidence
indicates that the only direct claims are held by the Partnership.
Moreover, since this action has not been brought as a derivative one,
Plaintiffs claims with respect to an accounting and for dissolution
lack any basis. Finally, although Plaintiff argued it should be
excepted from the derivative requirement, given the closely held
nature of corporation, the evidence in the record simply does not
8

support such an exception and, further, no proper Rule 56(f) motion
for continuance has been filed.
R. at 436. The trial court denied summary judgment based on the assignments. R.
at 434. The trial court, with respect to that motion, held: "After reviewing the
record in this matter, the Court finds disputed issues of fact with respect to whether
the Consents were properly executed and whether or not delivery of any
acceptance of consent occurred, preclude summary judgment on this basis at this
time." Id.
GLFP filed a motion for reconsideration, and a motion for leave to amend its
complaint. R. at 439-68. These motions were filed on November 15,2005. Id. In
the reconsideration motion, GLFP argued that it was improper for the trial court to
dismiss the dissolution claim: "While Plaintiff believes that the Court erred in
finding that the claims in question are derivative, this motion for reconsideration is
limited to the Court's extension of that finding to Plaintiffs second claim for
relief, which seeks dissolution of CL Management and Clark Learning Properties."
R. at 464. GLFP further sought leave to amend its complaint, stating that if leave
were granted, a yet undisclosed amended complaint "will contain allegations"
setting forth why GLFP failed to comply with applicable law and procedure. R. at
439. No draft amended complaint is attached to the motion, but a series of letters

9

discussing settlement proposals between GLFP's counsel and CL Management are
attached. See R. at 439-63.
CL Management opposed the post-judgment motions, and filed a separate
motion to strike GLFP's submission of settlement correspondence to the trial court.
R. at 469-80, 500-38. In the motion to strike, CL Management pointed out the
impropriety of GLFP's wholesale submission of settlement correspondence to the
trial court in violation of Utah Rule of Evidence 408. R. at 472-79. CL
Management, with respect to the reconsideration motion, argued that GLFP's
dissolution claim was founded upon the core derivative theories pled in the
complaint, and that GLFP should not be permitted to mask derivative damage
claims under the guise of a claim for dissolution. R. at 534-38. As for the motion
for leave, CL Management argued that the settlement correspondence between the
parties, if considered by the trial court, proved that CL Management did not
possess a conflict of interest justifying GLFP's admitted failure to comply with
applicable law and procedure. R. at 500-9.
On April 5, 2006, the trial court issued a minute entry, wherein the motion
for reconsideration was denied. R. at 575. The trial court stated:
Turning to the merits of the motions, after reviewing the record in this
matter and although a claim for dissolution is not typically derivative,
it is clear GLFP's claim is based upon the premise that CL
Management, as general partner, charged and collected improper fees
from Clark Learning Properties, Ltd. No independent and direct basis
10

for recovery has been alleged by GLFP. Accordingly, while
characterized as a dissolution claim, the Complaint, nonetheless, is
founded upon a derivative theory of recovery (fee mismanagement).
Id. Based on this ruling, the trial court denied as moot GLFP's motion for leave to
amend its complaint, and CL Management's motion to strike. Id. The trial court
signed a separate order and judgment granting summary judgment in favor of the
defendants on April 5, 2006. R. at 578-82. The judgment preserves GLFP's
ability, if otherwise appropriate, to file "proper derivative claims consistent with
Utah law." R. at 582. GLFP filed a notice of appeal on May 5,2006. R. at 590.
3.

Statement of Facts:
Clark Leaming Properties is a Utah limited partnership organized in 1988.

R. at 2, 207-8. CL Management, formed in 1983, serves as general partner of
Clark Leaming Properties. Id.; see also Appellant Br. Exs. 1-2. Mr. Howard Clark
and MB Management, Inc. are the general partners of CL Management. R. at 2078; Appellant Br. Ex. 1.
GLFP claims to be a limited partner of Clark Leaming Properties and CL
Management. R. at 2. GLFP was organized as a limited partnership, but in July of
2004, GLFP converted to a limited liability company. R. at 297-301. This
organizational conversion was completed without notification to the general
partners per the partnership agreements for CL Management and Clark Leaming
Properties. See R. at 208, 398. The other limited partners of CL Management are
11

HCFP, Ltd and the GAL Marital Deduction Trust. R. at 207-8, 388; Appellant Br.
Ex.1. HCFP, Ltd is also a limited partner of Clark Leaming Properties. Id. The
GAL Martial Deduction Trust, MB Management, Inc. and HCFP, Ltd are not party
to this litigation. See R. at 1.
On January 1, 2002, documents were signed entitled "ASSIGNMENT OF
INTEREST IN CL MANAGEMENT, LTD" and "ASSIGNMENT OF INTEREST
IN CL PROPERTIES, LTD." R. at 302-5. These documents each state that
"GLFP hereby quit claims and assigns, without warranty one-half to Sumerlea and
Ming all of. . . its right, title, and interest in and to the Partnership Interest." Id.
The assignment documents indicate that Ming, Ltd and Sumerlea, Ltd are separate
Utah limited partnerships. Id.; see also R. at 369-70. The assignments have been
recognized and implemented by the CL Management and Clark Leaming
Properties. R. at 367-68, 371-72. GLFP, through certain but not all members,
disputes the validity of the assignments. R. at 317-321, 413-16. However, no
claim exists in GLFP's complaint attacking the assignments, and Ming, Ltd and
Sumerlea, Ltd are not party to the action. See R. at 1-6.
The alleged factual bases for GLFP's complaint are that CL Management, as
general partner: 1) mismanaged the real property investments owned by Clark
Leaming Properties, and 2) collected excessive fees from Clark Leaming
Properties for the management and operational services it provided as general
12

partner. R. at 1-6, 207-9, 211-215, 224-5, 264-66, 272-73; Appellant Br. Exs. 1 2. These are the only factual theories set forth in GLFP's complaint alleged in
support of the solitary damage claim for breach offiduciaryduty. See R. at 1-6.
GLFP does not and never did own any of the properties it claims were
mismanaged, and GLFP has never paid any of the fees it claims were excessive,
commingled or misappropriated. R. at 1-6, 207-9, 211-215, 224-5, 264-66, 27273; Appellant Br. Exs. 1 - 2 .

CL Management, through Mr. Howard Clark,

provided admissible evidence establishing as an undisputed fact that all fees
charged and collected by CL Management from Clark Learning Properties were
properly imposed pursuant to the applicable partnership agreements, and that the
"burden of such expenses has been appropriately paid consistent with the terms of
such partnership agreements . . . . " R. at 209. GLFP failed to properly controvert
this and all other undisputed facts set forth in CL Management's motions for
summary judgment as required by Rule 7(c)(3)(A) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure. See R. at 253-56,345-46.

GLFP failed to separately controvert the undisputed facts set forth in the
summary judgment motions filed by CL Management as mandated by Utah Rule
of Civil Procedure 7(c)(3)(B). R. 253-56, 312-16, 345-46. Thus, CL
Management's statement of undisputed facts is deemed admitted for purposes of
the trial court's summary judgment ruling. Utah R. Civ. P. 7(c)(3)(A) ("Each fact
set forth in the moving party's memorandum is deemed admitted for the purpose of
summary judgment unless controverted by the responding party.").
13

GLFP admittedly failed to comply with the procedural and legal
requirements necessary to properly file derivative claims on behalf of Clark
Leaming Properties. Appellant Br. at 15-17; see also R. at 1-6, 439-63. Among
other things, GLFP failed to specify the nature of the purported derivative claims
to the general partner prior to the filing of its complaint. Id. GLFP's complaint is
not verified as required by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and there are no
allegations in the complaint setting forth with particularity the efforts that were
made to secure the resolution of the derivative claims prior to the initiation of its
lawsuit.

Id.

Moreover, the complaint does not contain any justification

whatsoever for GLFP's failure to comply with applicable law and procedure. Id.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
The gravamen of GLFP's complaint is that CL Management, as general
partner, mismanaged properties owned by Clark Leaming Properties, and that CL
Management collected excessive fees for its service as general partner. GLFP
further alleges that CL Management misappropriated the excessive fees by
"commingling" those funds so as to support "Clark-only" businesses. These are
the predominate factual themes upon which GLFP's complaint is constructed, and
they are the only factual theories supporting GLFP's effort to recover damages.

14

CL Management denies these allegations. In its summary judgment motion, CL
Management put forth evidence stating that all fees were properly determined,
allocated and assessed in accordance with the applicable partnership agreements.
From a legal and factual standpoint, however, GLFP's complaint is founded
and inextricably based on derivative theories of recovery.

If real property

investments owned by Clark Learning Properties were mismanaged by CL
Management, then Clark Learning Properties alone possesses that claim. The same
holds true for the fee claim. If CL Management, as general partner, collected
excessive fees from Clark Learning Properties and misappropriated those fees, then
Clark Learning Properties necessarily possesses that claim too. GLFP does not
own and has never owned any of the real property investments it alleges were
mismanaged. GLFP never paid a single fee it claims was commingled, excessive
and misappropriated.
GLFP attempts to avoid this straightforward legal reality by claiming that its
fee claim is direct because the purported excessive fees were "commingled" to
support Clark-only businesses. This argument may be successful in confusing the
point, but it does not transform the fee claim from derivative to direct.
The purported manner of misappropriation cannot, as a legal matter,
transform a derivative claim into a direct claim.

The manner of the alleged

misappropriation is legally irrelevant. This is so because GLFP never paid any of
15

the disputed fees - - they were paid exclusively by Clark Learning Properties. It
does not matter, from a legal standpoint, whether the alleged misappropriation
related to Clark-only businesses, or some other form of alleged misappropriation or
waste. Only the entity to have paid the fees, namely Clark Learning Properties,
possesses the right to contest the validity and subsequent use of the fees it paid to
CL Management for services rendered as general partner. GLFP cannot, for its
individual benefit, directly recover fees paid by Clark Learning Properties to the
detriment of the other limited partner, HCFP, Ltd (and the limited partners of that
entity), particularly given that HCFP, Ltd is not a party to this action.
As a fall-back, GLFP alternatively contends that the trial court erred in
refusing to excuse its failure to comply with applicable law and procedure. GLFP
argues that it should be permitted to directly pursue the derivative claims because
Clark Learning Properties is closely held, and the general partner of CL
Management, Mr. Howard Clark, possesses a conflict of interest.

These

arguments, as noted by the trial court, lack evidentiary support, and in any event
are not applicable to the undisputed facts of this case as a matter of law.
The closely held exception applies only if GLFP can establish, among other
things, that third parties will not be prejudiced by its direct assertion of claims
possessed by Clark Learning Properties. GLFP argues that CL Management was
required to prove that the closely held exception does not apply. However, the
16

Utah Supreme Court has held that it was GLFP's burden to substantiate the closely
held exception, which it failed to do.
Moreover, the undisputed evidence indicates that prejudice will indeed result
if GLFP is allowed to directly assert the alleged derivative theories of recovery.
MB Management is a general partner of CL Management, but MB Management is
not a party to this litigation. The GAL Marital Deduction Trust is a limited partner
of CL Management; however, the GAL Marital Deduction Trust is not before the
court either. HCFP, Ltd is a 45% owner of Clark Learning Properties, and
surprisingly HCFP, Ltd is not a party to this litigation. Prejudice certainly will
result if GLFP is permitted to directly pursue derivative theories of recover and
seek to dissolve CL Management and Clark Learning Properties when all these
parties are absent from this litigation. Utah law and procedure deserve respect.
GLFP cannot individually and for its own benefit pursue damage claims that are
necessarily possessed by the partnership entity of Clark Learning Properties, to the
prejudice and detriment of all other affected individuals and entities.
GLFP's final argument is that Mr. Howard Clark, the general partner of CL
Management, possesses a conflict of interest. GLFP contends that this alleged
conflict of interest rendered futile its compliance with applicable law and
procedure. This argument too is unsupported by evidence, and it also runs counter
to the Utah Supreme Court's recent decision in Dansie v. City of Herriman. 134
17

P.3d 1139, 1147 (Utah 2006) ("Courts must not leave such determinations of
futility to the subjective determination of the party [in this case GLFP] upon which
the law requires action; to do so unnecessarily risks stripping the corporation [or
limited partnership] of its rights."). GLFP, under the Dansie decision, is precluded
from claiming futility based on a one-sided post hoc effort to save its complaint.
GLFP's complaint is based on derivative theories of recovery. GLFP failed
to comply with the law and procedure necessary to properly assert those claims.
Even the dissolution claim is largely, if not exclusively, based on the derivative
theories of recovery set forth in the complaint - - those being property
mismanagement and fee misappropriation.

GLFP's inclusion of a dissolution

claim does not excuse or justify its failure to comply with Utah statutory law and
procedure. The trial court correctly granted summary judgment, and that judgment
should be affirmed.
ARGUMENT
1.

GLFP'S COMPLAINT IS BASED ON DERIVATIVE THEORIES OF
RECOVERY, AND GLFP FAILED TO COMPLY WITH
APPLICABLE LAW AND PROCEDURE.
In its complaint, discovery responses and by affidavit, GLFP identifies two

primary factual theories that support all of its claims. These theories are that CL
Management, as general partner: 1) mismanaged certain real property investments
owned by Clark Learning Properties, and 2) charged Clark Learning Properties
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excessive fees, and then misappropriated those fees to support Clark-only
businesses. R. at 1-6, 207-9, 211-215, 224-5, 255, 264-66, 272-73; Appellant Br.
Ex. 2. These theories are derivative as a matter of law, and GLFP failed to comply
with applicable law and procedure in filing its complaint.
GLFP never owned any of the properties it claims were mismanaged, and
GLFP never paid any of the fees it claims were excessive and misappropriated. Id.
Clark Learning Properties, not GLFP, owned the real property investments, and
paid the fees to CL Management for its service as general partner. Id. Given these
undisputed facts, GLFP's complaint contains derivative theories of recovery.
Aurora Credit Services. Inc. v. Liberty West Dev. Inc.. 970 P.2d 1273, 1280 (Utah
1998) ("Actions alleging mismanagement, breach of fiduciary duties, and
appropriation or waste of . . . [limited partnership] opportunities and assets
generally belong to the . . . [limited partnership], and therefore a . . . [partner] must
bring such actions on its behalf.") (Citations omitted); Phillips v. Kula 200 II. 667
P.2d 261, 265 (Haw. App. 1983) ("The resulting question is whether a limited
partner can maintain an individual action against the general partner for breach of
the fiduciary duty owed by the general partner to the limited partnership.

* **

Consequently, we hold that a limited partner may not bring a suit for himself and
in his own right on a cause of action belonging to the limited partnership.").
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CL Management disputes the mismanagement and misappropriation
allegations. R. at 27-37, 207-9. But even if these allegations had merit, CL
Management's duties as general partner, under the circumstances at-issue here,
were owed in the first instance to Clark Learning Properties, not GLFP directly.
Thus, as a matter of well established law, GLFP cannot sue directly for damages
arising from purported breaches relating to property mismanagement or fee charge
issues as alleged in its complaint:
The injuries for which plaintiffs' claim seeks redress are injuries that
defendants' alleged misconduct did not inflict directly on plaintiffs.
Rather, the alleged misconduct directly injured the Partnership.
Therefore, plaintiffs' injuries solely result from their proportionate
interest in the Partnership. Injuries that do not exist independently of
the Partnership or that are not directly inflicted on the limited
partners are derivative claims. Since plaintiffs have not complied
with the requirements of bringing a valid derivative claim, they lack
standing.
Litman v. Prudential-Bache Properties. Inc.. 611 A.2d 12, 17 (Del. Ch. 1992);
Arndt v. First Interstate Bank of Utah. 991 P.2d 584, 590 (Utah 1999) ("The
plaintiffs were therefore required to pursue the partnership claims in derivative
proceedings."); Utah Code Ann. § 48-2a-403(l) ("[A] general partner of a limited
partnership has the rights and powers and is subject to the restrictions of a partner
in a partnership without limited partners.").
GLFP nevertheless contends that the fee misappropriation claim is direct
because it is based on a "commingling" allegation. GLFP argues:
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If GLFP's claim was only that CL Mgmt had charged CLP excessive
fees, to the equal detriment of the Clarks/HCFP and Leamings/GLFP
as owners of CLP, the resulting legal claims could be classified as
derivative and belonging to CLP. But excessive fees were merely a
starting point, and not the lynchpin, of the Complaint. As noted, the
wrongful conduct at issue was the commingling and misdirection of
the excessive fees by CL Mgmt for the benefit of other Clark entities
and properties, with the result that GLFP received less distributions
than would otherwise have been true, and the Clarks received a
benefit that GLFP did not. The district court's summary judgment
order did nothing to analyze this issue, but merely held in a
conclusory fashion that the claims were derivative. Indeed the district
court does nothing to explain why commingling and misdirection of
assets by a general partner is not direct harm to a limited partner.
Appellant Br. at 9-10. This is GLFP's best effort to articulate a direct claim, and
even taking every portion of the statement into account, it admits to only a
derivative theory of recovery.3
The manner by which fees were allegedly misappropriated does not convert
a claim that is otherwise admittedly derivative into a direct theory of recovery.
The undisputed factual reality is that Clark Learning Properties paid the fees GLFP
is seeking to dispute. R. at 1-6, 207-9, 211-215, 224-5, 255, 264-66, 272-73;
Appellant Br. Exs. 1-2. The funds that were used to pay the disputed fees were
GLFP offers no defense for its property mismanagement claim, thereby
conceding that it constitutes a derivative claim possessed by Clark Learning
Properties. However, if the property mismanagement claim is derivative, the fee
claim necessarily is too. The allegedly misappropriated fees were paid to CL
Management for certain management services provided with respect to the real
property investments owned by Clark Learning Properties. The two theories
therefore are factually and legally linked; if the property mismanagement claim is
derivative, so too is the fee misappropriation claim.
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owned exclusively by Clark Learning Properties, not GLFP. Id. GLFP never paid
a single fee it claims was excessive, or misappropriated to support Clark-only
businesses. Id. Based on these facts, the law is unequivocal: GLFP lacks standing
to sue directly for the purported misappropriation of fees paid by Clark Learning
Properties to CL Management for its service as general partner, regardless of the
alleged manner of misappropriation, be it commingling or some other form of
waste:
[T]he initial injury for which the plaintiffs seek redress was to the
Partnership. That is, plaintiffs complain that the Partnership received
a lower amount of income because of the alleged misconduct. In
other words, the defendants inflicted the alleged injury directly upon
the Partnership.
Therefore, defendants' misconduct damaged
plaintiffs only to the extent of their proportionate interest in the
Partnership. Clearly, this was not a direct injury to the limited
partners or one that existed independently of the Partnership.
Litman v. Prudential-Bache Properties. Inc.. 661 A.2d 12, 16 (Del. Ch. 1992); see
also (" Golden Tee, Inc. v. Venture Golf Schools. Inc.. 969 S.W.2d 625, 629 (Ark.
1998) ("Looking to the federal court for guidance, when the individual limited
partner alleges wrong to the . . . Partnership that indirectly damage him by
'rendering his contribution or interest in the limited partnership valueless, the
limited partner is required to bring his claim derivatively on behalf of the
partnership.'") (Citation omitted).
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GLFP

cannot

separate

the

property

mismanagement

and

fee

misappropriation claims from Clark Leaming Properties. These factual theories
are necessarily derivative because GLFP has not suffered, according to its own
allegations and the undisputed facts, any harm distinct and independent of the
partnership entity itself.4

Under such circumstances, the law of Utah and

elsewhere is clear - - these claims are derivative, and to find otherwise will directly
contradict the Utah Supreme Court's recent decision in Dansie v. City of
Herriman. 134 P.2d 1139, 1144 (Utah 2006) ("A shareholder does not sustain an
individual injury because a corporate act results in disparate treatment among
shareholders. Rather, the shareholder must examine his injury in relation to the
All of the evidence before the trial court supported its summary judgment
holding. The affidavit by Ms. Merline Leaming confirms that: "CL Mgmt
manages the real estate holdings of CLP. CL Mgmt is funded by various fees
charged by CL Mgmt, . . .." R. at 265. The draft expert report submitted by
GLFP, to extent it should be considered at all, states: "94% of the income in 2003
was contributed exclusively by the various Clark Leaming Properties." R. at 272;
see also R. at 211-15, 225-25. Finally, Exhibit 2 to GLFP's appeal brief confirms
the derivative origin of its complaint. GLFP, in that Exhibit, admits that the harm
allegedly suffered by GLFP was in the form of "reduced or non-existent
distributions." Appellant Br. Ex. 2. A reduction in distributions to a limited
partner, based on an alleged harm suffered by the partnership, is the very definition
of a derivative claim. New York Life Insurance Company v. Ramco Holding
Corporation. 938 F. Supp. 754, 756 (N.D. Okla. 1996) ("Thus, when a limited
partner alleges wrongs to the limited partnership that indirectly damaged a limited
partner by rendering his or her interest in the partnership of lesser value, the
partner is required to bring the claim derivatively.'") (quoting Mallia v.
PaineWebber. Inc.. 889 F. Supp. 277, 282 (S.D. Tex. 1995). The property
mismanagement and fee misappropriation claims are derivative, and no fact to the
contrary exists in the record.
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corporation and demonstrate that the injury was visited upon him and not the
corporation."); see also See Energy Investors Fund. L.P. v. Metric Constructors,
Inc.. 525 S.E.2d 441,444 (N.C. 2000) (An injury '"is peculiar or personal to the . .
. [limited partner] if "a legal basis exists to support plaintiffs' allegations of an
individual loss, separate and distinct from the damage suffered by the . . . [limited
partnership].'"'").
GLFP failed to comply with the laws and procedures applicable to the
proper filing of derivative claims.

No allegations are included in GLFP's

complaint that satisfy the mandatory requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 48-2a1003 ("In a derivative action, the complaint shall set forth with particularity the
effort of the plaintiff to secure initiation of the action by a general partner or the
reasons for not making the effort."); Seaford Funding Limited Partnership v. M &
M Associates II. L.P.. 672 A.2d 66, 69 (Del. Ch. 1995) ("[L]imited partners in a
derivative complaint must allege with particularity the effort, if any, made to
secure the action desired from the general partner and the reasons the effort failed
or why they chose not to make the effort."); see R. at 1-6. Moreover, GLFP's
complaint is not verified, and does not set forth the information mandated by Rule
23.1 of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Utah R. Civ. P. 23.1 ("In a derivative
action . . . the complaint shall be verified and shall allege . . . with particularity the
efforts, if any, made by the plaintiff to obtain the action he desires . . . and the
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reasons for his failure to obtain that action or for not making the effort."); see R. at
1-6.5
The trial court correctly granted summary judgment.

GLFP's property

mismanagement and fee misappropriation claims are derivative as a matter of law.
These derivative theories represent the core of GLFP's complaint, and every claim
in the complaint rests in material part on these derivative claims. GLFP failed to
comply with the statutory law and procedure applicable to the proper assertion of
derivative claims. As such, GLFP's complaint was correctly dismissed pursuant to
summary judgment by the trial court. CL Management respectfully requests that
this Court affirm the trial court's judgment consistent with the Utah Supreme
Court's decisions in Arndt v. First Interstate Bank of Utah. 991 P.2d 584 (Utah

Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 23.1, among other things, requires the plaintiff
in a derivative action to set forth in a verified complaint that the plaintiff was a
limited partner "at the time of the transaction of which he complains ...." It will
be difficult, if not impossible, for GLFP to verify its standing to pursue the alleged
derivative claims. Executed assignments exist in the record, whereby GLFP
appears to have transferred its limited partnership interests in CL Management and
Clark Learning Properties to the separate entities of Ming, Ltd and Sumerlea, Ltd.
R. at 302-5. GLFP, through certain members, disputes the validity of its own
assignments. However, this is not true for all the members of GLFP. R. at 317338. Apparently a dispute exists internally within GLFP as to the validity of the
assignments. R. at 413-16. The assignments have been recognized and
implemented by CL Management and Clark Learning Properties. R. at 367-68,
371-72. GLFP's complaint makes no mention of the assignments, and Ming, Ltd
and Sumerlea, Ltd are not party to the litigation. R. at 1-6. The validity and
enforceability of the assignments must therefore first be resolved internally within
GLFP prior to the institution of any litigation, direct or otherwise, through GLFP.
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1999) and Dansie v. City of Herriman. 134 P.3d 1139 (Utah 2006), and in
accordance with Utah Code Ann. §§ 48-2a-1001 through 1006 and Utah Rule of
Civil Procedure 23.1.
2.

GLFP CANNOT JUSTIFY ITS FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH
APPLICABLE LAW AND PROCEDURE, AND THE ENTIRE
COMPLAINT WAS PROPERLY DISMISSED BECAUSE IT IS
INEXTRICABLY FOUNDED ON DERIVATIVE THEORIES OF
RECOVERY.
GLFP argues that its failure to comply with applicable law and procedure

should be excused. GLFP contends that Clark Learning Properties is closely held,
and therefore the trial court should have permitted GLFP to directly assert the
derivative claims set forth in the complaint. Appellant Br. at 14-17. GLFP further
argues that the dissolution and accounting claims are not derivative, and the trial
court thus erred in dismissing the entire complaint. Appellant Br. at 10-14.
GLFP's arguments are unavailing, and contrary to established Utah law.
The "closely held" exception does not apply as a matter of law, and GLFP
failed to present evidence in support of this argument. The closely held exception
only applies if it is established that the direct assertion of derivative claims will
not: "(i) unfairly expose the corporation or defendants to a multiplicity of actions,
(ii) materially prejudice the interests of creditors of the corporation, or (iii)
interfere with a fair distribution of the recovery among all interested persons."
Aurora Credit Services. Inc. v. Liberty West Dev.. Inc.. 970 P.2d 1273,1280 (Utah
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1998). GLFP, however, failed to present evidence in support of the closely held
exception, and the undisputed evidence proves the contrary, that being prejudice
will indeed result if GLFP is permitted to directly pursue the derivative theories of
recovery set forth in its complaint.
GLFP concedes that insufficient evidence exists to substantiate the
application of the closely held exception, but argues that it was CL Management's
responsibility to prove that the exception does not apply. GLFP contends that CL
Management, as general partner: "should be required to demonstrate that an
exception - e.g., prejudice to creditors - requires the claim to be pursued
derivatively, rather than directly." Appellant Br. at 16. This argument is contrary
to Utah law and procedure, and the Utah Supreme Court has already held that it
was GLFP's burden to establish the application of the closely held exception,
which GLFP failed to do.
Under Utah Code Ann. § 48-2a-1003 and Rule 23.1 of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, GLFP, not CL Management, was required to plead "with
particularity" in a verified complaint "the reasons" for its direct assertion of
derivative claims possessed by Clark Learning Properties. Moreover, pursuant to
the Utah Supreme Court's Aurora decision, GLFP alone was obligated to submit
evidence in support of the closely held exception. See Aurora. 970 P.2d at 1281
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("[A] minority . . . shareholder may proceed directly for corporate wrongdoing if
the shareholder can show that one of the exceptions applies.").
If GLFP's argument were accepted, the law regarding derivative actions
would be turned upside down. No authority exists to support the idea that GLFP
can directly sue for derivative claims in violation of Utah law and procedure unless
CL Management proves that the closely held exception does not apply. The
closely held exception is not presumed to apply. Rather, it was GLFP's obligation
to substantiate with evidence that the closely held exception applied, and GLFP
failed to do so. The trial court therefore correctly ruled: "[Although Plaintiff
argued it should be excepted from the derivative requirement, given the closely
held nature of the corporation, the evidence in the record simply does not support
such an exception and, further, no proper Rule 56(f) motion for continuance has
been filed." R. at 436; see also Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e) ("When a motion for
summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse
party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the pleadings, but the
responses by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific
facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Summary judgment, if
appropriate, shall be entered against a party failing to file such a response.").
The undisputed evidence, moreover, establishes that prejudice will result if
GLFP is permitted to directly pursue the derivative claims set forth in its
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complaint. GLFP claims that all of the "key parties" are before the court. But this
is not true.

MB Management, Inc., a general partner and owner of CL

Management, is a separate corporate entity and it is not party to this litigation. See
R. at 1, 207-9, 211-15, 265, 388; Appellant Br. Exs. 1-2. The GAL Marital
Deduction Trust is a limited partner of CL Management, and it too is not before the
court. Id. HCFP, Ltd, yet another separate limited partnership, is a 45% limited
partner of Clark Learning Properties, and it is noticeably absent from the litigation.
Id. Moreover, GLFP fails to address the third party obligations Clark Learning
Properties has with respect to its real property investments in Phoenix, Sacramento,
Santa Monica and Monterey. Id.
The closely held exception cannot apply as a matter of law. GLFP has failed
to name all of the relevant parties, including one of the general partners of CL
Management, that being MB Management, and a limited partner that owns 45% of
Clark Learning Properties, that being HCFP, Ltd. Kemp v. Murray. 680 P.2d 758,
761 (Utah 1984) ("Allowing plaintiff to go forward individually could subject
defendants to multiple liability and could spawn multiple litigation among the
partnership, the individual partners, and defendants. This would be unfair to
absent partners, unfair to defendants, and contrary to judicial economy. That is
undoubtedly why Rules 17(a) and 19(a) forbid such a result."); see also Utah R.
Civ. P. 23.1 ("The derivative action may not be maintained if it appears that the
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plaintiff does not fairly and adequately represent the interests of the shareholders
or members similarly situated in enforcing the right of the corporation or
association.").
The trial court properly dismissed GLFP's dissolution and accounting claims
as well. GLFP claims that it possesses standing to pursue the dissolution and
accounting claims even if the property mismanagement and fee misappropriation
claims are derivative.6

Appellant Br. at 10-14. The accounting claim is not a

separate claim, but rather GLFP requested an accounting "as part of the
dissolution" claim against CL Management and Clark Learning Properties. R. at 6.
However, GLFP does not dispute, and indeed must concede that its complaint is
fundamentally based on the purported derivative theories of recoveries for property
mismanagement and fee misappropriation. See R. at 1-6. The dissolution claim is
a remedy requested in part based on the core derivative theories of recovery set
forth in the complaint. Id.
The inclusion of a dissolution claim in the complaint does not excuse
GLFP's failure to comply with applicable law and procedure. GLFP cannot avoid

6

GLFP raised this argument in its motion for reconsideration. A motion for
reconsideration is not authorized under Utah procedure. Gillett v. Price. 135 P.3d
861, 863 (Utah 2006) ("In fact, postjudgment motions to reconsider are not
recognized anywhere in either the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure or the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure."). The trial court was forced to reject this argument
twice. See R. at 436, 575.
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the requirements of Utah law and procedure by simply including a claim for
dissolution. The complaint, given its derivative foundation, was deficient and
subject to dismissal at the outset because it was not verified, and GLFP failed to
otherwise comply with the substantive and procedural requirements mandated by
Utah law. See Richardson v. Arizona Fuels Corp.. 614 P.2d 636, 640 (Utah 1980)
("The eleventh cause of action alleges the possibility of other conversions . . . and
alleges that the defendants should be required to account... for all of the assets ..
. and disgorge themselves of any assets so converted. This claim also clearly
belongs to the corporation.").
Finally, and most critical, GLFP cannot seek the dissolution of CL
Management and Clark Learning Properties because GLFP failed to name all of the
required parties to such an action, including one of the general partners of CL
Management, and a 45% owner of Clark Learning Properties. See Kemp v.
Murray. 680 P.2d 758 (Utah 1984); Terracor v. Utah Bd of State Lands & Forestry.
716 P.2d 796, 798 (Utah 1986) ("[T]his Court may address . . . [a standing] issue
sua sponter); Seftel v. Capital City Bank. 767 P.2d 941, 944 (Utah App. 1991)
("We also note that a party may raise the issue of failure to join an indispensable
party at any time in the proceedings, including for the first time on appeal.").
GLFP's complaint is fatally defective on many grounds, and the trial court
correctly dismissed it pursuant to established Utah law and procedure.
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3.

GLFP'S FUTILITY ARGUMENT BASED ON A CLAIMED
CONFLICT OF INTEREST POSSESSED BY CL MANAGEMENT
LACKS MERIT, AND WAS RENDERED MOOT BY THE
SUMMARY JUDGMENT DECISION.
GLFP, as its final argument, contends that the trial court erred by failing to

grant GLFP leave to amend its complaint so as to include unspecified allegations
regarding a purported conflict of interest possessed by Mr. Howard Clark in his
capacity as one of the general partners of CL Management. Appellant Br. at 17-19.
Simply put, GLFP seeks to be excused from its failure to comply with Utah
statutory law and procedure based on the after-the-fact belief that Mr. Howard
Clark possesses a conflict of interest regarding the alleged derivative claims
because these claims challenge Mr. Howard Clark's conduct. Id. In support of
this futility/conflict of interest theory, GLFP submitted to the trial court numerous
documents reflecting settlement discussions between GLFP's counsel and Mr.
Howard Clark.7

CL Management filed a motion to strike the submission of settlement
documents to the trial court. The trial court determined that the motion was moot,
given the entiy of summary judgment, but it is CL Management's position that the
wholesale filing of settlement documentation with the trial court was and is
prejudicial. See R. at 469-79. GLFP cannot save its complaint by attempting to
plead the content of settlement discussions in violation of Utah Rule of Evidence
408. GLFP further claims that Mr. Howard Clark has admitted a conflict of
interest by offering, after the entry of summary judgment, to "involve respected
third party experts for assessment of the merits or any purported derivative
Cont'd.
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GLFP's futility/conflict of interest argument is unsupported in the record,
and more importantly, it has already been rejected by the Utah Supreme Court in
the decision of Dansie v. Citv of Herriman, 134 P.3d 1139 (Utah 2006). It is more
than significant that GLFP only mentions this decision by way of footnote because
a complete reading of the opinion confirms that the trial court's decision must be
affirmed. See Appellant Br. at 15 n. 3.
In Dansie. the Utah Supreme Court sets forth an extensive analysis regarding
the futility exception (based on a conflict of interest or otherwise), and held that it
is only applicable in two limited circumstances, both of which do not apply to this
case as a matter of law. See Dansie. at 134 P.3d 1147. Moreover, in Dansie. the
Utah Supreme Court rejected the very argument in substance offered by GLFP in
this appeal:
Before us, Plaintiffs allege that the continued antagonistic
relationship between Plaintiffs and [the Defendant], as evidenced by
this litigation, demonstrates that a perfectly crafted demand would
have been futile. However, this is the first instance where they
present such a claim. The second amended complaint, in which
claims." Appellant Br. at 18. This statement does not show bad faith, or that
complying with Utah law and procedure would have been futile. Rather, it proves
the opposite. Mr. Clark is empowered under the partnership agreement to retain
such experts, and the use of third party experts in the evaluation of alleged
derivative claims is an accepted, proper and reasonable practice. R. at 385;
Whalen v. Connelly. 593 N.W.2d 147, 156 (Iowa 1999) ("We believe that the
language of . . . the partnership agreement is sufficiently broad to include the
authority of the board to appoint a special committee to investigate a demand made
by a limited partner.").
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Plaintiffs brought their derivative claims, makes no mention of
the futility exception and fails to address why demand would have
been futile. This fact alone would be a sufficient basis for turning
away Plaintiffs' futility claims: however, even had Plaintiffs
properly preserved their futility claims, a close analysis shows
that they are insufficient to satisfy the exception and waive the
demand requirement.
It is axiomatic that the right to seek the redress of corporate
grievances belongs to the corporation to be exercised by corporate
management. See, e.g., In re Kauffman Mut. Fund Actions, 479 F.2d
257 (1st Cir. 1973). Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 23.1 provides an
exception to this general rule by allowing members or shareholders to
bring derivative actions, but this exception must be carefully applied
in order to protect the right of corporations to govern their own
affairs. In re Kauffman, 479 F.2d at 263-64. Therefore, we must
exercise considerable caution before using futility to relieve a
shareholder [or limited partner] of his obligation to make a statutorilyrequired demand.
This presumption is further strengthened by the relative ease
with which demand can be made. A potential litigant would, of
necessity, have prepared and outlined the legal claims upon which his
lawsuit will be based. The marginal cost for presenting these
claims to corporate management and demanding that they take
them up is so insignificant that to strip the corporation of its
rights based solely on conjecture or a post hoc judicial
determination would be unreasonable in most instances. Courts
must not leave such determinations of futility to the subjective
determination of the party upon which the law requires action; to
do so unnecessarily risks stripping the corporation of its rights. In
fact, it will generally require less effort for the plaintiff to make a
demand on the corporation than to satisfy rule 23.1 's stringent
pleading requirements. For this reason, application of rule 23.1 's
futility exception requires close scrutiny.
Dansie. 134 P.3d at 1146-47 (Emphasis added); see also Arndt v. First Interstate
Bank of Utah, N. A., 991 P.2d 584, 589 (Utah 1999) ("It seems reasonable, then, to
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infer that the same principles apply to define derivative actions in the limited
o

partnership context as in the corporate.").
The Utah Supreme Court has also rejected GLFP's argument of futility
based on the claim that Mr. Howard Clark's conduct is called into question by the
alleged derivative claims. A general partner is responsible for conducting the
operations of a limited partnership. See Utah Code Ann. § 48-2a- 403 ("[A]
general partner of a limited partnership has the rights and powers and is subject to
the restrictions of a partner in a partnership without limited partners."); U.S. v.
Heffner. 916 F. Supp. 1010, 1012 n. 2 (S.D. Cal. 1996) ("[T]he general partner
controls the business of the limited partnership to the exclusion of the limited
partners.").

Thus, if GLFP's argument were accepted, virtually any act or

omission by a general partner can be labeled as involving a conflict of interest.
Even if the trial court had allowed GLFP to amend its complaint, GLFP's
complaint still would have remained deficient, and subject to immediate dismissal.
GLFP did not state in its motion to amend that it planned to include proper verified
allegations regarding standing as required under Utah Code Ann. § 48-2a-1002 and
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 23.1. Moreover, GLFP's proposed amendments do
not address, resolve, or even touch upon the fact that GLFP has failed to name
several critical and required parties to this litigation, including MB Management (a
general partner of CL Management), HCFP, Ltd (a 45% limited partner of Clark
Learning Properties), and Ming, Ltd, and Sumerlea, Ltd (both recognized limited
partners of CL Management and Clark Learning Properties), among other parties.
Kemp v. Murray. 680 P.2d 758, 761 (Utah 1984). GLFP's proposed amendments,
were incapable of saving its complaint. Trethewav v. Furstenau. 40 P.3d 649, 654
(Utah App. 2001) ("[A] court should deny motions to amend 'when the moving
party seeks to assert a new claim that is legally insufficient or futile.'").
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This goes too far and would render the laws and procedures applicable to
derivative actions in the limited partnership context meaningless. For this reason,
GLFP's argument has already been rejected by the Utah Supreme Court:
We conclude that adoption of such a rule in Utah would virtually
dissolve any distinction between derivative and direct actions based
on breach of fiduciary duty, mismanagement, etc., in the limited
partnership context, despite the fact that these are the very actions
traditionally defined as actions that must be brought derivatively. See
Richardson v. Arizona Fuels Corp., 614 P.2d 636, 639 (Utah 1980).
We also conclude that the blanket adoption of such a rule would
ignore concerns justifying derivative actions that we addressed in
Aurora Credit - that direct suits could expose defendants to a
multiplicity of actions, that direct suits could materially prejudice the
interests of other potential partnership creditors, and that direct suits
could interfere with a fair distribution of the recovery among all
interested persons.
Arndt. 991 P.2d at 589-90.
GLFP's complaint violates applicable law and procedure, and nothing under
Utah law, or the undisputed facts excuses GLFP's conduct. The record reveals Mr.
Howard Clark and CL Management have acted reasonably and consistent with
Utah law throughout. GLFP cannot claim that Mr. Howard Clark possesses a
conflict, or that GLFP should be excused from complying with applicable law or
procedure simply because CL Management refused to accept GLFP's unexplained
and unsubstantiated settlement demand. Utah law and procedure are worthy of
respect, and required more of GLFP. The trial court properly granted summary
judgment consistent with the Utah Supreme Court's holdings in Arndt v. First
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Interstate Bank of Utah. N.A.. 991 P.2d 584 (Utah 1999) and Dansie v. City of
Herriman. 134 P.3d 1139 (Utah 2006), and in accordance with Utah Code Ann. §§
48-2a-1001 through 1006 and Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 23.1.
CONCLUSION
For the above stated reasons, CL Management and the other defendants
respectfully request that the trial court's motion for summary judgment be affirmed
in its entirety.
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